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Summary
Presented in this paper is a methodology to
evaluate, analyze, and predict critical human
performance. The methodology is a novel
approach towards evaluating potential human
error. The aim of the Critical Human Perform
ance and Evaluation Program. (CHPAE) is to
develop a methodology to control and minimize
the natural sulbjectivity associated with evaluation
programs. The typical approach, of the CHPAE
is; (1) analyze the system or task, (2) select
evaluation factors, (3) establish and prevalidate
a rating manual or check list, (4) perform an
analysis and evaluation;, (5) estimate potential
error probabilities, and (6) perform critical
comparison studies. Much work still remains to
be done towards a complete and final validation
of the program--partly because there is a variety
of methods both computerized and manual that
can, be applied to quantify the evaluations and
partly because of the need of large population
statistics, other than, experimental or selected
source data to validate the error potential
p r e d i c ti on of th e plan» Regardless of th e early
limitations of the metric, the plan will perform
a valuable human factors evaluation of a group of
tasks, subsystems or systems.
Introduction
The evaluation, and prediction, of potential
human error is one of the most perplexing and
evasive problems facing the modern state-of-theart. By relative comparison with the technologi
cal progress of hardware failure prediction
technology, the investigation and solving of
problems involving equipment failures or
unscheduled holds, where the breakdown of the
human interface has been the causative factor,
is today's most fertile area toward improving
total systems effectiveness and systems relia
bility.
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Systems reliability cannot be assessed by
considering hardware and hardware alone. All
facets of integrated hardware, man/machine,
and/or extra-environmental factors must be
considered. Also, rational consideration is
required to take into account not only the poten
tial probabilities of the beast's inhumanities to
man, but also man's inhumanities to the sensi
tive beast.
History of Past Research
Very little is known about potential human
error prediction; even less is known about the
reliability metric describing the man/machine
interface.
Without sparing sophistication to either
extreme, both qualitative and quantitative
attempts at human factors prediction and analysis
of probable human error have been proposed.
Regardless of these attempts, human errors are
continually being reported.
The following reports are typical of human
error dilemma. Shapero and Bates (I960)
published a report revealing the impact of
human induced failures involved in military
weapons systems. 1 This report states that:
a. Thirty-nine percent of 3, 829 mal
functions related to weapons systems were
classified as human initiated.
b 0 Twenty percent of 419 unscheduled
holds were classified as human initiated.
c. The analysis of two systems using the
Ballistic Missile Division Failure and
Code List revealed 322 human initiated
malfunctions in one system and 193 in the
othe r .
A report by W. I. LeVan (I960) discloses the
following facts.
(1) of nine Air Force pro
grams reviewed, 20 and 53 percent of the field
errors were caused by human failure, (2) of
Army Satellite Programs, up to 60 percent of
the failures were attributed to human error, and
(3) of weapon, missile, and guidance systems,
12 to 45 percent of the failures were attributed
to human error.
There is a well-defined requirement for a
human factors potential error prediction, evalua
tion, or analysis program, especially one which
is relatively easy to apply, versatile and

Objectives

unrestricted in its application, practical, and
not overly complex in its formulation.
Critical Human Performance, Analysis, and
Evaluation Rationale (CHPAE)

The objectives of the applied CHPAE
methodology are to:
a. Establish a criticality rank related to
human performance.

The CHPAE methodology employs system,
task, and factor analysis in conjunction with
correlated actual and/or experimental failure
data to evaluate and establish a rated criticality
rank of human performance. The criticality is
based on the probability of successful human
performance.

b. Predict personnel effectivity or proba
bility of human induced failure related to
operation, checkout, and/or maintenance
of a system.
c. Identify and eliminate sources of poten
tial critical human induced failures.

The CHPAE metric is a statistical analysis
of the representative rated distributions and/or
expression of computerized matrix techniques
applied to the rated factor comparisons.

d. Estimate required check redundancy
for most probable success.

As sumptions

e. Evaluate designs from a human factors
or man-compatibility point of view.

The assumptions of the CHPAE method
ology are:

f.

b. Conversely, the worst possible human
potential input with the worst possible
machine and/or environmental conditions
propagate the greatest probability of
human error and the least reliability for
success.
Methodology Goals and Philosophy
The goal of the CHPAE program is to
present a methodology for evaluating critical
human performance.
The philosophy is to design a methodology
which:

h. Establish goals for optimum human
reliability.
Typical Technical Approach
The methodology is basically applied as a
program in, three phases. The technique is
versatile and. is applicable to a system, sub
system, event, activity,,, or 'task. The evaluation
or rating manuals can be tailor-made to a
particular1 system,* or developed as a generalized
rating manual. 'The generalized approach would
apply to a family of systems, subsystems, or
even generalized to yield "ballpark" estimates
of random activity.

Phase I of the methodology comprises:

a. Provides a technical approach that
systematically establishes a criticality
rank of human performance.

a. Analyzing the system,

b. Is both qualitative and quantitative,
versatile in its application, and relatively
easy to apply by both human factors person
nel and reliability engineers.
c. Incorporates a methodology having the
inherent capability to use manual or
computer methods for the processing of
data.

Evaluate predesign concepts.

g. Provide inputs to training programs
identifying and stressing areas of critical
human performance.

a. Ideal potential human input interacting
with ideal machine and /or environmental
conditions facilitate the least probability
of human error and the highest reliability.

b.

Establishing the rating manual,

c.

Yerifying the rating or evaluatUm

manual,

Phase II is the evaluation effort and
includes:

a. The actual rating, analysis,
evaluation*

d. Preparing necessary mathematical
models and procedures to predict the
degradation the human element introduces
to the system or subsystem.

b. Establishing the performance criticality.
c. Performing the overall systems criticality study
analysis*
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Phase III is the documentation, mainten
ance, and follow-up phase. It also includes final
test and validation of the project, and final
validation of the rating manual.
Pre-Validating the Rating Manual
The CHPAE is a pre-validated critical
factor approach to the evaluation and prediction
of critical human performance. Pre-validation
is accomplished by first developing a preliminary
rating manual, selecting a representative sample,
rating the sample, applying the preliminary
manual, and then comparing the results to
experimental data source or actual failure data.
Figure 1 outlines the validating procedure.

After validation of the preliminary manual,
the final proportionate value weightings assigned
to the factors are dependent on their correlation
and contribution or ability to predict a valid
critical rank. This can be accomplished by
multiple or partial correlation coefficients in
conjunction with trial re-runs of the sample
validation procedure, until the rating manual is
calibrated to provide a valid critical rank.
Evaluation Procedure
The initial point of departure as to where
to begin the evaluation is of no major importance.
All activities of events will be summarized from
the subtasks up through the subsystem and
finally summarized and compared for the total
system.

Developing the Evaluation Manual

The evaluations can be performed for a
task, a group of sub-tasks, or for an activity „
In any event, a complete task analysis and study
of all technical, environmental, tools, equip
ment or other affecting facets of the man/
machine interface is required prior to the

Development of the evaluation manual is
preceded by project exploratory systems or task
analysis. The purpose of the exploratory study
analysis is to select representative critical
factors which best represent the man/machine
and/or man/environment interfaces. Candidate
critical performance factors are first proposed
in the preliminary evaluation manual. Typical
candidate critical performance factors are
shown in Table 1. The critical factors elected
to be employed in the final evaluation manual are
the factors which provide the optimum evaluation
of the system or project and have the highest
correlation with prediction of potential human

evaluation.
Pertinent information from the study and
analysis is recorded on a typical rating specifi
cation form (See Figures 3 and 3A). The criti
cal factors are rated by applying the evaluation
manual and assigning related degrees and points.
Rating consideration is given to all facets of the
activity, and substantiating data is recorded to
support the rating.

Critical Factor Definition

CHPAE Metric

The factors selected are verbally defined
and a rating assigned to the factors. The rating
scale is by the degree of error confidence or
probable error related to the degree of difficulty.
Following definition, of the factors and degrees,
task and/or activities of experimental or actual
data of known probabilities are slotted in their
proper or estimated level, in, the defined rating
scale. The slotted known or experimental
probabilities in the rating scales are referred to
as ''''inference marks". Figure 2 shows a typical
definition of factor degree and inference marks
used in the CHPAE approach*

The CHPAE model is an abstract matrix
representation of the performed activity and the
affecting man/machine or man/ma chine/environ
ment factors. The abstract model is represented
as a total two way classification matrix or a split
matrix as shown in Table II. Table II delineates
a typical activity matrix with 12 selected
factors and the 10 tasks which comprise the
activity.
Variance Analysis
The variance model is computerized as a
12 x 100 combined matrix with a subroutined
split matrix 5 x 100 for the man affecting fa9tors
and 7 x 100 split matrix for the machine /environ
mental affecting factors. The variance analysis
is first performed on the total matrix and then
subroutined to the split matrices.

The slotting of inference data of known or
validated task probabilities is a continuous up
dating effort. As the feedback procedure cranks
more and more actual data back into the rating
manual, the evaluation predictions become more
confident and consistent.

The variance analysis model is represented
as follows ;3

Value Weighting and Point Assignment
Values apportioned to the factors are based
on the criteria of optimum 'prediction for criticality ranking. The preliminary values are slotted,
known, or estimated task probabilities.
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Table I
Candidate Critical Performance Evaluation Factors

Motivation

Accessibility

Personnel Qualifications

Work Space

Auditory Threshhold Criticality

Environmental Conditions

Personnel Adaptation

Work Hazards

Visual Demands

Equipment Hazards

Mental Demands

Physical Demand

Access Openings

Communications; Visual Aural

Protective Clothing

Lighting or Illumination

Protective Devices

Operational & Field Support

Visual Presentation of Information

Special Demands & Precautions

Warning & Signaling Devices

Test Equipment & Tools

Mechanical Indicators

Displays and Controls

Special Systems Requirements

Anthropomorphic Requirements

Human Dynamics

Supervision & Inspection

Crew Arrangement

Training

Ease of Maintenance

Work Pressure

Biological Factors

Documentation Errors

Occupational Factors

Engineering Change Errors
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IDENTIFICATION
The identification error factor appraises the probability that an error in identification
will be committed when an object identified incorrectly and then treated as if it were the
correct object. Consideration shall be given to evidence that suggests the frequency of
errors of identification is much higher than any probable human error.

FACTOR LEVEL DESCRIPTION

DEGREE

PTS.

Little or no probability of an identification error occurring
Inference Marks (R = . 975 ± 2. 5%)
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Read and identify simple electrical or mechanical instrumentation
Simple leak checks
General visual inspection
Simple operational checks
Identify items involving routine tasks
Remove and replace black boxes
Remove and replace standard piping (no complications)

20% confident that an identification error will occur at least once

18

Inference Marks (R = . 90 ± 5%)
o
o
o

Install complex subassemblies
Fault checks and isolation of detailed electronic instrumentation
Read and follow complex instructions

25% confident that an identification error will occur at least once

28

Inference Marks (R = . 75 ± 5%)
o
o

Highly complex instrumentation readings involving highly complex
systems
Highly complex troubleshooting

40% confident that an identification error will occur at least once
Inference Marks (R = . 60 ± 5%)
o

Consideration for redundancy or redesign of procedures required
to maintain reliability

Figure 2.

Factor Definition
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45

ACTIVITY TITLE:

INSTALL S-IC WORK PLATFORM TO

65636373 PANEL SUPT. ASSEMBLY

TASK TITLE :

ACTIVITY LOCATION:

FACTORS

S-IC INTERSTAGE

ACTIVITY CODE: 1261

TASK CODE:
R-lnher: .975
CRITICALITY-. II

REDUNDANCY

SUBSTANTIATING DATA

DEG PTS
2

8

ATTENTION

PLATFORM SUBASSEMBLIES NOT DIFICULT TO INSTALLMINOR SUBASSEMBLIES
FITTING AND ALIGNMENT NOT DIFFICULT- MINOR
SUBASSEMBLIES

1

0

IDENTIFICATION

ROUTINE TASK IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

1

7

SIMPLE OPERATIONAL CHECKS
ROUTINE READING OF BLUE PRINTS
MODERATE PHYSICAL EFFORT -REQUIRES HANDLING
PLATFORM IN DIFFICULT WORK POSITION

1

7

MEMORY

INTERPRETATION
PHYSICAL DEMAND

SAFETY OF OTHERS HANDLING PLATFORM OVERHEAD
X m 6.3

8

2

8

TOTAL , ft
PTS. 5B

d- m 1.2

OPERATION OR
PROCEDURES
WORKING
CONDITIONS
SPECIAL DEMANDS
& PRECAUTIONS
OPERATIONAL
SUPPORT
COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT
HAZARDS
WORKING SPACE
ACCESSIBILITY

ACCESSIBILITY IS ADEQUATE

Xe 78.7

2

SIMPLE ROUTINE DUTIES ASSEMBLING PLATFORMS

1

140

POSSIBLE HYPERGOL CONTAMINATION, ENVIRONMENT
CONTAINS POSSIBLE ELECTRIC HAZARDS

3

95

NO SPECIAL TOOLS OR TRAINING

1

70

CONSTANT MONITOR REQUIRED

2

65

TELEPHONE LINE AVAILABLE-LITTLE OR NO
INTERFERENCE
EXERCISE CARE, HANDLING EQUIPMENT. TO PREVENT
DAMAGE TO FLIGHT CRITICAL ITEMS AND WIRING

2

65

3

85

3

55

WORK ENVELOPE ADEQUATE

*e 26.6

Figure 3.

3 55
,,,
TOTAL 635
PTS.

Typical Rating Specification
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ACTIVITY CODE: 1261
TASK CODE:

SATURN V MAINTAINABILITY

ACTIVITY TITLE: INSTALL S-IC WORK PLAT
TASK TIME: 15
FORM TO 65 B36373 PANEL SUPT. ASS 'Y
TASK TITLE:
CRITICALITY: 11
PERSONNEL REQUIRED: 2
Rinh:- .975
LOCATION: S-IC INTERSTAGE
FUNCTIONAL OR ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION
PLAN AND PERFORM ALL REQUIRED TASKS TO INSTALL THE S-IC INTERTANK
WORK PLATFORMS. WORK IS PERFORMED PRIOR TO CRYOGENIC LOADING
AND AFTER REMOVAL OF THE ARMING TOWER

HUMAN PERFORMANCE
VERIFY ALL ACCESS REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN MET

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

TRANSPORT LIGHTING EQUIPMENT AND ROLL AROUND PLATFORM
SUBASSEM8LIES FROM STORAGE AREA ON LUT LEVEL TO WORK
PLATFORM AT THE END OF SERVICE ARM
INSTALL SUPPORT ASSEMBLY 85B-36382-1 AND FASTEN INTO
PLACE WITH TOGGLE CLAMP
INSTALL SUPPORT ASSEMBLY 85B-36382-2 AND FASTEN IN
PLACE WITH TOGGLE CLAMP
INSTALL STRUT ASSEMBLY 85B-369H1 AND FASTEN INTO PLACE
INSTALL BRACE ASSEMBLY 85B-36625-I AND FASTEN INTO PLACE
INSTALL 85B36619- 1 PANEL SUPPORT ASSEMBLY AND FASTEN
TO 65B36382-1
INSTALL 65B36373-1 PANEL ASSEMBLY POSITIONING TO
MATCH 65B3619-1 PANEL SUPPORT ASSEMBLY
INSTALL 65636385-1 HANDRAIL ASSEMBLY AND LOCK TO
65B36382-1 SUPPORT ASSEMBLY AND 65B-36619-1 PANEL
SUPT ASSEMBLY

Figure 3A.

Typical Rating Specification
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Table II
Abstract Man/Machine Computer Matrix

•*•

1

Machine /Environment

Man

Activity

1

w ^" *•**•

^

h

J2

J3

J4

J5

J6

J7

J8

J9

J 10

j ll

J 12

Task i

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

3

1

1

1

1

Task i~

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

1

2

1

1

1

3

1

2

3

3

3

Task i

2

1

1

2

2

Task i

2

1

1

2

2

1

1

3

2

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

1

1

2

1

2

1

2

2
2

4

Task i
Task i

6

Task i
Task i

8

Task i g

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

2

2

1

2

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

3

1

1

2

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

1

3

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

3

1

1

Task i Q
'
i

i

n

Split Matrix
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where:

Computing the CHPAE Metric

Y. . = The rating in the ith task row and the j t
factor column.

The computation of the CHPAE metric is
accomplished by statistically comparing the
rated distributions and statistical parameters of
the total matrix and split matrices. Representa
tive confidence curves are prepositioned such that
an ideal rating of the interface would reflect
little or no overlap of the confidence curves and
that when X - X =0, the interface index would
be highly critical.

u = General mean.
a^ = Rating effect of the i
factor treatments.
T - = Rating effect at the j
factor treatments.

row level of the

column level of the

e..
S error,
ij = Random rating
The following formula is applied to the
matrix to analyze the variance of task probability
ratings .

By considering the variance of the scores,
the inherent rated reliability of the interface
is formulated below:
P.
inh
- K

(10)

P.
inh

(2)
where:
• •
ij

•'•J

^

J

where:
(3)
S l = I (Y. - Y . . . ) 2 = Sum of the squares
due to the factor treat
ij
ments, (r-1) degrees of
freedom.
(4)
^ - X (Y. . - Y. - Y. + Y . . . ) = Sum of the
squares for total
^
ij ^
variance.
and:

u = ~~T = Variance distributed as F, if H
true.
S
4.

C

is

(u

- u ) = k or 0

X

= Average Environmental Rating
= Average Man Rating

V

- Rating Variance - Environment

d

= Activity Margin,

O"

= Total Variance

u

= Arbitrary Ideal Population - Man,

(5)

u

°

_

_

R = 100 - Q (t-Table)

_

2
3

the specific points in the distribution curve
actually overlap each other, a test of assurance
can. be applied to- a probability of success, "P",
and, confidence level, M C", to yield, a statistic of
assurance,. IT T ",.

(?)
= Z (Y.. - Y . . . ) 2 /(c-l) = Sum of squares
of task ratings (c-1)
^
ij
degrees of freedom

Then, the test of assurance (T ) is as
follows:

= Sum of total variance as in (4).

TA =

(8)

52

P., , - K
inh
7

1/N +K 2
2N-1

and:

u - — = Distributed as F if H

is true.

(11)

For assurance that (1) the probability of

where:

S

= Arbitrary Ideal Population - Environment
The percent reliability, "R", is determined

(Y.. - Y. - Y. + Y ...r/(r-l)(c-l)

S

<L

to t-Tables.
by referring calculated P.
inh
(6)

- Y ...) Z /(c-l)

= Rating Variance - Man,

0"

The variance analysis related to factor
treatments and the activity is expressed as:
£ (X

c*

X

where;

(9)

53

K = from CM Square Table
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(12)

A math model of the critical index computa
tion is illustrated in Figure 4. The reliability
index is extracted from output A.

Conclusions
The CHPAE program is a novel approach
to rate the man/machine interface.

Performance Criticality Rank
The CHPAE criticality rank is obtained by
ranking the significance level of the rated
inherent probability P. , . - probability of
successful human performance.

Once established, the plan can be applied
with relative ease by psychologists, physiologists,
biologists, human factors specialists, and
reliability engineers. It provides a valuable tool
for evaluating critical human performance, per
forming human error analysis, evaluating
system and hardware designs, performing main
tainability analysis, determining training
requirements, and evaluating human operational
requirements. The plan is designed also to
facilitate computer programming and calculation
backup.

The criticality scale is as follows:
Criticality I

- Above 0. 1% level

Criticality II

- 1% to 0. 1% level

Criticality III - 5% to 1% level
Criticality IV - Below 5% level
Criticality V

The program is both qualitative and
quantitative in design and sufficiently versatile
for application to a wide variety of human tasks
and activities.

- Below 10% level

CHPAE Systems Approach
The computation of the systems probabili
ties can be pooled and summarized up to the
systems level. However, since the program
carries a rated controlled judgment, the desir
able confidence precision is best maintained by
pooling up to the activity levels and posting the
results to the systems criticality comparative
analysis. This type of format chart is illustrated
in Figure 5. Series, parallel, and redundant
sub-tasks, tasks, activities, events, etc. must
be considered in the task and activity pooling.
Redundancy must also be considered in the
comparative analysis.

The CHPAE program has been designed to
control and minimize the natural subjectivity
associated with evaluation programs. The
metric is in terms of the probable potential
human error and the probable significance of
the rated reliability.
Glossary
Analysis of Variance - The magnitude of
rated or estimated factor differences and the
extent to which they differ from the residual
mean square as a test of hypothesis that such
differences are compared with the 5% and 1%
fiducial levels of the standard F distribution.
CHPAE Matrix - A grid of classified man/
machine critical factors.

Application to Single or Random Activity General Program
An evaluation program for single or random
activity can be accomplished by developing a
generalized plan, including an evaluation manual
with generalized factors which will rate most
human activities. The general plan can have an
open end to add or substitute one or five factors.
In most cases, interpolation of the factors will
suffice where the factors do not quite fit the task
or activity.

CHPAE Metric - A matrix analysis of
rated probability estimates and varients; one
distribution representing man's critical rated
factors and one distribution representing the
rated environmental varients. The variance
analysis of the rated factors establish within
confidence precision, the percentage of rated
potential error in a particular activity or task.
CHPAE Model - A statistical abstract or
schematic representation of the man/machine
affecting factors and/or man/machine/environ
ment interface.

Computer Backup
The CHPAE program has been designed to
facilitate computer programming and computer
support. It is highly desirable that computer
time be requested if a large number of activities
are to be evaluated. Computer application
relieves the analyst of the cumbersome task of
making statistical calculations, and provides
backup support to non-math personnel such as
psychologists, biologists, and human factors
specialists.

CHPAE Redundancy - The number of
repeated performances required in a given
sample in order to assure one completely
successful performance.
Critical Factor - A performance factor
which, if not performed in accordance to correct
procedure or design requirements, has the
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(x2 ENVIRONMENT)

X! MAN

0*2
VARIANCE
ENVIRONMENT

UAWANCEMAN
OQ
1C
H
CD
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ACTIVITY
VARIANCE

ACTIVITY
MARGIN

100-Q
(2)

CD
TEST

OUTPUT A

(3)
P..99

CONFIDENCE

PERFOtMANCE

OUTPUT B

CRITICALITY

SUB- SYSTEMS COMPARISON BY CRITICALITY RATING
SUB-SYSTEM SUB-SYSTEM SUB-SYSTEM SUB-SYSTEM SUB-SYSTEM SUB-SYSTEM SUB-SYSTEM SUB-SYSTEM
A
E
B
F
D
C
6
H

I

II
IND
00

to

III

IV

V
Figure 5 0

Systems Criticality Comparison Matrix

greatest adverse effects on the total system's
performance, crew safety and cost.

u Mood, A. M. Introduction to the Theory
of Statistics, 1963, McGraw-Hill, Inc.

Human/Initiated Malfunction or Human
Error - On equipment failure or an unscheduled
hold in which the human can be identified as the
causitive agent in the immediate train of events
leading to the failure.
Human Operation - A human component in
a process which translates a system from one
state to another.
Malfunction - A general term used to
denote the occurence of failure of a product to
give satisfactory performance. In this report,
malfunctions are considered to include equip
ment failures, procedural failures and
unscheduled holds.
Man/Machine Interface - Assumed line of
interaction between man and machine. Systems
where man and machines are interacting
together in a given environment to achieve given
objectives.
Reliability - The probability of adequate
performance of a specified function or functions
for a specified time in a given environment.
Statistical Parameter - A representative
statistical value or estimator.
System Representative Factor - A constant
or variable factor which represents an affecting
man/machine/environment characteristic of the
system.
Task Analysis - An analytical process
employed to determine the demands which human
and machine components make upon each other in
a given operational context. Task analysis
usually involves (1) Identification of performed
sequence of operations, (2) Identification of
human and equipment components related to
analyzed tasks, (3) Analysis of man/machine
interaction, (4) Evaluation of performance time
and, (5) Analysis of affecting factors such as
environmental conditions, hazard to men and
equipment, malfunctions, potential human error
and others.
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